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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

I

STATE OF UTAH#
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

i

DENNIS LEROY WAITE,

:

Case No. 890615-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for five counts of
securities fraud, all felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
61-1-1 (1989) and five counts of theft by deception, four of
which are second degree felonies and one of which is a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990), as the appeal is from a
district court in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a
first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the State followed the provisions of the

Financial Information Privacy Act when it obtained defendant's
bank records.

The trial court's ruling that the exemption

provision found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-50 (Supp. 1990) applied
to this case is reviewed under a correction of error standard.
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989).

2.

If the trial court erred in determining that the

exemption to the Financial Information Privacy Act applied to
this case, whether the error was harmless.

To determine whether

an error is sufficient to warrant reversal of a conviction, the
appellate court must determine whether there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in the
absence of the error.

Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) and State v.

Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in admitting

summaries of defendant's financial records which were prepared by
an investigator from the Utah Securities Division.

The standard

for reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence is whether the ruling was clearly erroneous.

State v.

Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Utah 1989).
4.
defendant.

Whether the trial court correctly sentenced

A sentencing decision will not be disturbed unless it

exceeds that prescribed by law or is an abuse of the court's
discretion.

State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 3, 1988, defendant was charged with five
counts of securities fraud, all felonies, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 61-1-1 (1989), and five counts of theft by deception,
four of which are second degree felonies and one of which is a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-405
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(1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 19-22).

On March 31, 1989,

defendant filed a memorandum in support of a motion to suppress
defendant's bank records obtained by an investigator of the Utah
Securities Division (R. at 80-99).

The motion was heard on April

6, 1989, and denied (R. at 100 and 265J.1
The matter came on for trial by jury on August 3-4,
1989, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, district judge, presiding (R. at
2
105-107 and 263-64).

Defendant was found guilty of all ten

charges (R. at 106 and 201-10).

On September 18, 1989, defendant

was sentenced to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison on five counts of securities fraud and four
counts of theft by deception which were second degree felonies.
He was also sentenced to a concurrent term of zero to five years
on one count of theft by deception which was a third degree
felony.

Defendant was ordered to pay restitution to all of the

victims (R. at 224-33).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 24, 1986, defendant, Dennis L. Waite, and
Donald Stoddard and Arlo James became partners in a business
known as Elite Investment Association, with defendant serving as
general partner, and the other two as limited partners (R. 263 at
105, R. 264 at 4 and Exhibit 14-S).

The group was formed with

The transcript of seven hearings, including, inter alia, the
suppression hearing and sentencing proceedings, is contained in a
separate volume which has been numbered as part of the record as
page 265.
2
The two volumes of trial transcript are numbered as pages 263
and 264 in the record.
-3-

the intent of pooling money for investment purposes (R. 263 at
106).

Defendant drew up the agreement forming the association

and conducted the business of the organization (R. 263 at 105106).

Defendant would "research[] all of the bonds" and then

meet with Stoddard and James to advise them which bonds to invest
in (R. 263 at 107-109 and R. 264 at 5).

The group invested in

bonds from St. George and Park City in November and December of
1986, and bonds from Arizona, Montana, and Ogden in May and June
of 1987 (Exhibit 23-S).

None of the victims of the crimes

charged in this case were investors in the bonds purchased by
Elite Investment in late 1986 and early 1987 (Exhibit 23-S, R. at
19-22, and R. 263 at 115-16).
On March 12, 1987, defendant tendered his written
resignation "as partner, trustee and bookkeeper in the Elite
Investment Association" (Exhibit 20-S, R. 263 at 119-20, and R.
264 at 6-7). On that day, defendant turned over the records of
the association to Arlo James; these records consisted of a
typewritten page listing the assets and disbursements of the
association, and a sheet of paper listing the bonds purchased,
the investors and amounts invested in the Park City, St. George,
Ogden, and Montana bonds (R. 264 at 7-8 and Exhibits 21-S and 22S).

From the information provided by defendant, James prepared a

summary of investors and bonds involved in Elite Investment
Association (Exhibit 23-S and R. 264 at 9-10).

Before

defendant's resignation, commitments to purchase three additional
bonds had already been made; pursuant to these commitments, Elite
Investment, now minus defendant, followed through with those
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purchases (R. 263 at 120-21).

After those commitments were met

in June 1987, Elite Investment never purchased any more bonds (R.
264 at 13-17).
On September 22, 1987, some six months after defendant
resigned from Elite Investment, he met with Fawn and Ken Kendrick
to help them reduce their income taxes (R. 263 at 16-17).
Defendant told them that they needed a tax shelter and spoke to
them about purchasing municipal bonds (R. 263 at 18). Defendant
telephoned Mrs. Kendrick in November of 1987 and "said he had a
very good bond with West Jordan [Sewer]" (R. 263 at 19). On
December 8, 1987, the Kendricks gave defendant a check for
$10,000.00 made out to Elite Investment Association (R. 263 at 19
and Exhibit 1-S). Mrs. Kendrick's understanding at the time was
that she and her husband were purchasing a municipal bond with
West Jordan City (R. 263 at 19). One to two weeks later, the
Kendricks received a "Certificate and Receipt", purportedly from
the Elite Investment Association and signed by defendant as
trustee of that association (R. 263 at 20 and Exhibit 2-S). The
certificate stated that the Kendricks owned 100 percent of a
$10,000.00 municipal bond from West Jordan Sewer and Water.

The

bond carried an interest rate of 8.67 percent with semiannual
payments each year (Exhibit 2-S).
The following month, January of 1988, defendant
telephoned Mrs. Kendrick to tell her that he had an interest
check for the Kendricks and asked if they wanted it mailed to
them or reinvested.

The Kendricks asked that it be mailed to

them; after several phone calls to defendant, the Kendricks

-5-

received a check for $372.30, dated January 20, 1988 (R. 263 at
22).
In May of 1988, the Kendricks tried to contact
defendant about an interest check that they should have received
in April on a different bond for which they had given defendant
money in October, 1987 (R. 263 at 21-23).

Mrs. Kendrick finally

spoke with defendant by phone in mid-July, 1988, at which time
she informed him that she had spoken to the West Jordan City
Attorney.

The city attorney had told her that West Jordan had

not issued any municipal bonds since 1984 (R. 263 at 24-25).
Defendant told Mrs. Kendrick that her husband had consented to
the purchase of Summit County-Park City bonds instead.

Defendant

told her that these bonds carried the same interest rate and that
they were insured by FDIC (R. 263 at 25). Mrs. Kendrick asked
that the bonds be put in the Kendricks' names and defendant
responded that he was in the process of having that done (R. 263
at 26). Defendant then sent the Kendricks a copy of a Park City
Revenue bond which was registered to Elite Investment
Association, was issued in 1986, and carried an interest rate of
6.4 percent (R. 263 at 27 and 44-45 and Exhibit 3-S). Mrs.
Kendrick became concerned about the discrepancies in the amount
of the bond, the maturity date, and the interest rate.

After

contacting defendant about her concerns, she contacted the Utah
Securities Division (R. 263 at 27-28).
In December, 1987, Blaine Mecham also went to defendant
for assistance with his income taxes; again, defendant mentioned
the use of municipal bonds as a tax shelter (R. 263 at 50-51).
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aware of the name was when he received the certificate (R. 263 at
74 and 79-80).

Mr. Neria never received any other document

showing an ownership interest in the University of Denver bond;
neither did he receive any interest payments (R. 263 at 70).
Gordon and Shirley Jensen became acquainted with
defendant when he sent them a letter stating that many former
Kennecott employees (all of the victims are former Kennecott
employees) "had erred in figuring their income tax and sending in
their severance pay."

Defendant's letter told them he would try

to get money back for them if they would contact him.

The

Jensens eventually did contact defendant who, after reviewing
their taxes, said that their returns had been filled out properly
and he could not help them (R. 263 at 82-83).

Defendant told the

Jensens that they needed a tax shelter, and suggested a bond (R.
263 at 83). The Jensens obtained cashier's checks totaling
$2,000.00, which they gave to defendant on approximately January
12, 1988 (R. 263 at 83-84 and Exhibits 9-S and 10-S).

When they

gave defendant the money, he told them that he could not make the
bond without his secretary present and she was out of the office
(R. 263 at 84). After several attempts to contact defendant, the
Jensens eventually received a "Certificate and Receipt" from
Elite Investment Association, signed by defendant as trustee, and
stating that the Jensens owned 2 percent of a "$100,000.00
University of Denver $2,000.00 Municipal Bond," with interest at
the rate of 8.97 percent and semiannual payments (R. 263 at 84
and Exhibit 11-S).
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By stipulation, the State proffered the testimony of
Marie Shanley,
who works at the First Interstate Bank in
Denver, Colorado. She is a trust officer for
the bank. One of her duties is to issue all
of the University of Denver bonds. She is
familiar with the bonds issued at the
University of Denver. She has reviewed all
of her records for the years 1985 through
1988 and would testify that there were no
University of Denver bonds issued in the name
of Dennis Waite or Elite Investment.
(R. 264 at 38-39).
Merlin J. Smith, of the Utah Securities Division,
investigated the allegations against defendant beginning in July
of 1988 (R. 264 at 19-20).

On August 2 and 10, 1988, Mark

Griffin, Assistant Utah Attorney General, Securities Division,
signed applications seeking access to specified financial records
involving this case (Brief of Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.],
Addendum C(l); the appellate record in this matter was
supplemented by stipulation with copies of the applications,
affidavits in support thereof, and orders which had been filed in
a separate district court file).

Based on the orders signed in

response to those applications, Mr. Smith reviewed bank records
involving defendant (R. 264 at 20). Copies of those records were
introduced at trial as Exhibits 17-S and 18-S (R. 264 at 1). A
summary of the deposits and withdrawals from those records was
compiled by Mr. Smith and introduced, over defendant's objection,
as Exhibit 25 (R. 264 at 27-28).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The investigation of defendant's financial dealings
conducted by the Utah Securities Division was not an
-10-
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securities, the securities fraud counts punish defendant for acts
different from the acts supporting the theft by deception
charges.
The trial court did err by sentencing defendant to
prison terms of one to fifteen years on the securities fraud
counts.

The statute, at the time defendant was convicted and

sentenced, mandated a prison term of zero to three years for
securities fraud.

This case should be remanded to the trial

court to correct the sentences for the securities fraud counts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT
WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH IN THE INVESTIGATION
OF DEFENDANT'S BANK RECORDS.
In the first two points of his brief, defendant
contends that the State failed to comply with the provisions of
the Financial Information Privacy Act in obtaining his bank
records.

Consequently, the records were inadmissible at trial.

In 1988, the act provided:
No person acting in behalf of the state,
or any agency, office, department, bureau or
political subdivision thereof, shall request
or obtain, by subpoena or otherwise,
information from a state or federally
chartered financial institution regarding the
financial transactions or other records
reflecting the financial condition of any
person without first obtaining written
permission from the person whose financial
transactions or other records of financial
condition are to be examined, or obtaining an
order from a court of competent jurisdiction
permitting access to the information. . . .
As used in this act "person" shall include an
individual, corporation, partnership or
association.
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Section

) -27-49

No information obtained directly or
indirectly from a financial institution in
violation of the provisions of this act shall
be admissible in any court of this state
against the person entitled to notice.
The act is inapplicable to certain investigations.
Before it was amended in 1989, the act provided:
Nothing in this act shall apply where an
examination of said records is a part of an
official investigation by any local police,
sheriff, city attorney, county attorney, the
attorney general, or the State Department of
Public Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery
Services, Department of Social Services.
Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-50 (1987) (amended 1989).
Before trial, defendant filed a memorandum in support
of a motion to suppress his financial records (R. at 80-99).

The

gravamen of his argument was that he had not been given notice of
the application and order for access to the records, and that the
affidavits upon which the applications were based were faulty
because of a notary problem.

Defendant did include a conclusory

paragraph that the records were not obtained as part of an
official investigation by the attorney general (R. at 83). When
the motion came on for hearing on April 6, 1989, defendant
focused on the failure to give notice (R. 265 at 2-9). In
response, the State argued that the heading of the applications
and orders bore the name of the attorney general, and the
applications were signed by an assistant attorney general (R. 265
at 9-10).

The State also argued that the investigator from the

Securities Division gave notice to defendant by delivering a
letter to the Tooele County Jail, where defendant was being held,
to defendant's wife, and to Arlo James, president of Elite
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In order to sustain the trial court's ruling that this
investigation was "an official investigation by . . . the
attorney general," this Court would have to determine that the
mere signing of pleadings by an assistant attorney general serves
as an adoption of investigations which are being conducted by
other state agencies.
too far.

This stretches the meaning of S 78-27-50

The State concedes that the investigation of defendant,

conducted by the Securities Division of the Utah Department of
Business Regulation, was not an official investigation by the
attorney general.

The attorney general merely acted as counsel

for the Securities Division; he did not independently or jointly
initiate or conduct the investigation.

Consequently, the notice

provisions of § 78-27-46 should have been complied with by the
investigating agency.

Since the provisions were not followed,

the bank records were inadmissible under § 78-27-49.
POINT II
EVEN THOUGH THE BANK RECORDS SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ADMITTED AT TRIAL, THEIR ADMISSION WAS
HARMLESS ERROR.
Even though it was error to admit the bank records at
trial, such error does not necessarily require reversal of
defendant's convictions.

Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure, states:
Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded.
In State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Supreme
Court said:
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In order to constitute reversible error,
the error complained of must be sufficiently
prejudicial that there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for Lht
defendant in its absence.
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defendant had resigned from the Elite Investment Association (R.
264 at 6-7 and Exhibit 20-S).

After becoming concerned because

they had not received an expected interest payment, the Kendricks
checked with West Jordan and found that that city had not issued
any municipal bonds since 1984 (R. 263 at 25).

When contacted,

defendant told them that he had, without informing them, invested
their money in a Park City bond instead (R. 263 at 25).

He then

sent them a copy of a bond which had been issued in 1986, a year
before they invested their money (Exhibit 3-S). The issuance
date of this bond coincides with the evidence from the other
partners of Elite Investment about Park City bonds which were
purchased by that association for other investors in 1986 (R. 264
at 16-17 and Exhibits 21-S, 22-S, and 23-S).

Defendant also told

the Kendricks that he was "in the process" of putting the bonds
in their names (R. 263 at 26). The copy of the 1986 bond shows
that it was issued to Elite Investment (Exhibit 3-S).
The Jensens, Mechams and Neria were told that their
money was going to be invested in bonds issued by the University
of Denver (R. 263 at 51-53, 66-67, 84, and 92, and Exhibits 6-S,
8-S, 11-S, and 13-S).

They never received any bonds; defendant

merely sent them certificates, purportedly from Elite Investment
(R. 263 at 53-55 and 68-69, and Exhibits 6-S and 8-S). When the
Jensens gave defendant their money, he told them that he could
not make out the bond to them without his secretary present and
she was out (R. 263 at 84).

After repeated contacts, defendant

finally sent the Jensens the certificate purportedly from Elite
Investment (R. 263 at 84).
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Defendant, in January 1988, told Mr. Steel that
defendant had already received $112,000.00 from investors to
purchase the University of Denver bonds, and that the bond had to
be purchased within one week (R. 263 at 100). When Mr. Steel did
not receive an expected interest payment from the bond, he called
and asked defendant if defendant had purchased the bond.
Defendant said that he had, and that the bond was sitting in Mr.
Steel's "records" (R. 263 at 96). By stipulated proffer, the
State established that no bonds in the name of defendant or of
Elite Investment Association had been issued by the University of
Denver in the years 1985 through 1988 (R. 264 at 38-39).
This admissible evidence establishes that defendant
took money from five people or couples, promising to purchase
specific bonds for them.

The evidence also establishes that

defendant did not purchase those bonds even though he told the
investors that he either had, or would within one week of
receiving the money.

This evidence supports defendant's

convictions, even without the use of the bank records.
Theft by deception is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6405 (1990), as:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises control over property of another
by deception and with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
When defendant obtained the money of the five victims in this
case he exercised control over their property.

The deception and

purpose elements of theft by deception were proven by defendant's
actions in telling the victims that he was using their money to
purchase bonds for them.

The bonds were never purchased.
-19-

That,

by itself may not have supported defendant's convictions;
however, defendant also told some of the victims that he already
had the bonds and that the bonds were contained in the victim's
file.

Another victim received a copy of a bond which had been

purchased two years earlier by investors in Elite Investment
Association.

Defendant also held himself out to be a trustee of

Elite Investment, several months after he had resigned from that
organization.

These acts of deception support the jury's

determination that defendant deceived the victims in this case,
and that his purpose was to permanently deprive the victims of
the money which they had given him.
Securities fraud is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1
(1989), as:
It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.
When defendant offered to purchase securities for the victims,
making the untrue statements which are enumerated above, he
committed the crimes of securities fraud.

A review of the

practice which defendant used to bring the victims to him, to
offer to buy the bonds, then to attempt to lull the victims with
certificates from an organization of which defendant was no
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longer part, supports the jury's determination that defendant
employed a scheme to defraud, or engaged in a practice or course
of business which operated as a fraud on the victims.
POINT III
BECAUSE THE STATE CONCEDES THAT DEFENDANT WAS
ENTITLED TO NOTICE UNDER S 78-27-46, THE
ARGUMENT THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE UNDER
OTHER THEORIES NEED NOT BE ADDRESSED.
Defendant next argues that he was entitled to notice
that his financial records were going to be accessed under other
theories even if the exemption of § 78-27-50 applied to this
case.

Because the State concedes that the exemption of that

section, as it read at the time defendant's records were
accessed, is not applicable to this case, this argument need not
be addressed.
POINT IV
THE ISSUE OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
SUMMARIES OF THE FINANCIAL RECORDS PREPARED
FOR TRIAL ALSO NEED NOT BE ADDRESSED.
Defendant's next contention is that the summaries of
the account records prepared by the investigator should not have
been admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
While the summaries would normally have been admissible under
3
rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence, the fact that the underlying
This rule reads:
The contents of voluminous writings,
recordings, or photographs which cannot
conveniently be examined in court may be
presented in the form of a chart, summary, or
calculation. The originals, or duplicates,
shall be made available for examination or
copying, or both, by other parties at a
reasonable time and place. The court may
order that they be produced in court.
-21-

account records were not admissible makes it unnecessary to
address defendant's claim.

If the account records were not

admissible, summaries of those records also were not admissible.
POINT V
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED FOR BOTH
THEFT BY DECEPTION AND FOR SECURITIES FRAUD;
HOWEVER, THE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR SECURITIES
FRAUD WAS INCORRECT.
Defendant argues that the securities fraud counts are
lesser included offenses of the theft by deception counts, and
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) and (3) (1990) prohibit conviction
and punishment for both crimes. Although defendant mentions both
of these subsections, they are not interchangeable, and his legal
analysis mainly addresses the lesser included offense language of
subsection (3).
Section 76-1-402(1) and (3) read:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision[.]

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged
or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
-22-

(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
Subsection (1) addresses cases in which a defendant is
charged with separate crimes arising out of a single criminal
episode.

The crimes are not necessarily charged as lesser

included offenses; in fact, the charges may be separate counts of
the same crime.

For example, in State v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040

(Utah Ct. App. 1987), Suarez was convicted of three counts of
forcible sexual abuse.

Suarez challenged his conviction,

maintaining that two of the counts were the same offense.

This

Court affirmed the convictions, holding that, although both
counts charged forcible sexual abuse, they were separate offenses
because they were based on separate acts of the defendant.

In

Suarez, the defendant had
first placed his mouth on the victim's
breasts, the taking of indecent liberties,
and then placed his hand on her vagina.
These are separate acts requiring proof of
different elements and constitute separate
offenses. . . . No violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-1-402(1) (1978) appears.
736 P.2d at 1042 (citation omitted).

See also State v. Porter,

705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (defendant's convictions of
aggravated burglary of an apartment, burglary of a laundry room
in the same apartment complex, and theft were affirmed as
separate acts); State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986)
(defendants' convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of firearms were
affirmed); State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Utah 1989)
(defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, two
counts of aggravated sexual assault, and one count of aggravated
robbery affirmed).

In O'Brien, the Utah Supreme Court said:
-23-

The intent of [Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(1)] is clear. A defendant may not be
punished twice for a single act. Although
defendants' [sic] crimes were committed
during a single criminal episode, the crimes
were a result of separate and distinct acts
that resulted in separate and distinct
crimes.
721 P.2d at 900 (footnote omitted).

While subsection (1) does

overlap with subsection (3), i.e., a defendant may not be
punished twice for a single act, subsection (1) is not limited to
crimes which are lesser included offenses.
Although admittedly a close question, defendant's
convictions do not violate subsection (l)'s "same act" provision.
To analyze the acts which make these separate crimes, it is
necessary to examine the elements of the crimes charged.
by deception is defined by statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405

(1990) reads:
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises control over property of another
by deception and with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur,
however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive
ordinary persons in the group addressed.
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation
of wares or worth in communications addressed
to the public or to a class or group.
Deception is defined as follows:
"Deception" occurs when a person
intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or
conduct an impression of law or fact that
is false and that the actor does not
believe to be true and that is likley
[sic] to affect the judgment of another in
the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression
of law or fact that the actor previously
_9A-

Theft

created or confirmed by words or conduct
that is likely to affect the judgment of
another and that the actor does not now
believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring
information likely to affect his judgment
in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or
encumbers property without disclosing a
lien, security interest, adverse claim, or
other legal impediment to the enjoyment of
the property, whether the lien, security
interest, claim, or impediment is or is
not valid or is or is not a matter of
official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely
to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which performance the actor
does not intend to perform or knows will
not be performed; provided, however, that
failure to perform the promise in issue
without other evidence of intent or
knowledge is not sufficient proof that the
actor did not intend to perform or knew
the promise would not be performed.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (1990).
Securities fraud is criminalized in the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989) provides:

It is unlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase
of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.
The evidence presented at trial was that defendant
offered and sold securities to the victims in a fraudulent scheme
or practice.

The actual sales of the securities were the acts
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for which defendant was convicted of theft by deception.

If

those were the acts for which defendant was convicted of
securities fraud, the securities fraud convictions could not
stand.

Convictions for both theft by deception and securities

fraud based on the same acts of selling securities to the victims
would violate section 76-1-402(1).

If, on the other hand, the

securities fraud convictions were based on the offers to sell
securities to the victims, the convictions can coexist.

The acts

of offering to sell the securities were distinct from the acts of
selling the securities.
The record is not totally clear as to whether the
securities fraud counts were based on the offer or the sale of
the securities.

The jury instructions do not differentiate

between the two different acts.

Instruction No. 12 recites Utah

Code Ann. § 61-1-1, including "in connection with the offer,
sale, or purchase of any security" (R. at 171). Instruction No.
13 separately defines "security," "sale" or "sell," and "offer"
or "offer to sell" (R. at 172-73).

Instruction No. 14 defines

the phrase "in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security" (R. at 174). Instructions No. 18 through 22 give the
elements of each of the counts of securities fraud; each recites
the language of section 61-1-1. The first element of each
instruction is: "That between October 24, 1987 through August 3,
1988, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Dennis
Waite, a party to the offense, did offer, sell or purchase a
security" (R. at 178-82).

In that regard, the jury instructions

did not draw attention to the difference between the act of
offering and the act of selling a security.
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Neither is the trial record completely clear as to
whether the State's theory of the case was that the securities
fraud was based on the offer of the securities.

In his initial

closing argument, the prosecutor did not focus on which acts,
other than the deception, specifically supported the securities
fraud counts (T. 264 at 56-67).

The defense attorney did focus

on the offer element when he said, "Mr. Waite did not offer to
sell [the victims] a security" (R. 254 at 70). In final closing,
the prosecutor did concentrate the jury's attention on the act of
offering to sell a security:
The defense seems to think we are piling
it on, I guess, by charging him with both
theft by deception and securities fraud.
What I tried to suggest to you is that the
reason he is charged with the securities
fraud is because he offered to sell a
security, a bond. If he had been offering
something totally unrelated, then he never
would have been charged with that. But in
addition to the securities fraud, he violates
the theft statute by simply taking the money
and not delivering anything. Whether it is
stocks, bonds, whatever. It is the fact he
took the money, he deceived these people, and
that makes it a violation of both of these
statutes. We see that from time to time
where criminal conduct violates more than one
statute that has been passed by the
legislature. So, it is not a situation where
we just decided to charge him with as many
counts as we could. It is the situation
where the facts seem to apply to both of
these different statutes.
(R. 264 at 80). If this may be called the prosecution's theory
of the case, it supports defendant's convictions on all ten
counts.

If the jury was focused on the offers as the acts for

which they convicted defendant of securities fraud, those acts
were separate from the acts which supported the theft by

-27-

deception, and no violation of section 76-1-402(1)'s "same act"
provision occurs.

However, if the jury was not properly focused

on the offers, but convicted defendant of securities fraud for
the sales of the securities, those acts were the same acts that
constituted the theft by deception, and the securities fraud
convictions cannot stand.
Defendant's legal analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402
concentrates on subsection (3), which deals with lesser included
offenses.

An offense is included when "[i]t is established by

proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged."
S 76-1-402(3)(a).

Utah Code Ann.

In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the

Supreme Court stated:
[T]he greater-lesser relationship must be
determined by comparing the statutory
elements of the two crimes as a theoretical
matter and, where necessary, by reference to
the facts proved at trial.
674 P.2d at 97. The elements of the crimes of theft by deception
and securities fraud are set out above. A theoretical comparison
of the elements demonstrates that securities fraud is not a
lesser included offense of theft by deception.

In State v.

Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962), the Utah Supreme
Court established the rule as to when one offense is included in
another.

The Court said:
[T]he greater offense includes a lesser one
when establishment of the greater would
necessarily include proof of all of the
elements necessary to prove the lesser.
Conversely, it is only when the proof of the
lesser offense requires some element not
involved in the greater offense that the
lesser would not be an included offense.
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371 P.2d at 29 (emphasis added).

See also State v, Williams, 636

P.2d 1092, 1096 (Utah 1981) (quoting the above citations from
Brennan); State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064, 1066 (1978) ("when the
proof of what is claimed to be a lesser offense requires some
element not necessarily involved in the greater offense, then the
claimed lesser offense would not necessarily be an offense
included in the greater one").
While there is overlap between the fraud element of the
two statutes, there is a distinction which makes securities fraud
a separate offense, not a lesser included offense.

Theft by

deception occurs when a person "obtains or exercises control over
property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive
him thereof."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405.

Securities fraud

occurs when "any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . . (1)
employ[s] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) make[s]
any untrue statement of a material fact or . . . omit[s] to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading; or (3) engage[s] in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person."

Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1. Theft by deception

involves the elements of obtaining or exercising control over the
property of another with the intent to deprive him thereof; these
elements are not required to prove securities fraud.

The only

overlapping element of the two crimes is the deception or fraud
element.
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The element required for securities fraud which is not
required for theft by deception is that the fraud must be "in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security."
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-1. This element must be proven in order to
establish the crime of securities fraud but is not involved in
proving the crime of theft by deception.

Consequently, under

Brennan, Williams, and Gandee, securities fraud is not a lesser
included offense of theft by deception.

The trial court

correctly imposed sentences on defendant for all ten crimes of
which he was convicted.
The inquiry does not end with a theoretical comparison
of the elements.
1989).

State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Utah

Quoting Hill, the Court said:
The secondary test is required by the
circumstance that some crimes have multiple
variations, so that a greater-lesser
relationship exists between some variations
of these crimes, but not between others. . .
A theoretical comparison of the statutory
elements of two crimes having multiple
variations will be insufficient. In order to
determine whether a defendant can be
convicted and punished for two different
crimes committed in connection with a single
criminal episode, the court must consider the
evidence to determine whether the greaterlesser relationship exists between the
specific variations of the crimes actually
proved at trial.

780 P.2d at 1240 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Hill, 674
P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)).

Even under this secondary test,

defendant was properly convicted of both securities fraud and
theft by deception.

The State proved the theft by deception

charges when it proved that defendant obtained money from five
different victims; that he obtained the money by means of
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deception; and that he demonstrated a purpose to deprive the
victims of the money.

Securities fraud was proven when the State

presented evidence that defendant used a fraudulent scheme in
connection with the offer of a securities.

The deception or

fraud, manifested by the same acts of defendant, overlapped
between the two crimes.

However, the State was required to prove

that defendant obtained the property of the victims with the
purpose to deprive them thereof in order to establish theft by
deception.

It was then required to prove the additional fact

that the fraudulent scheme was in connection with the offer of
securities in order to prove the securities fraud charges.
Subsection (3)(a) is written in terms of "facts
required to establish the commission" of the offenses (emphasis
added).

The facts which establish the elements of theft by

deception and of securities fraud may have some overlap; however,
either theoretically or under the specific variations of the
crimes, different facts are required to be proven to establish
the different crimes.

Consequently, securities fraud is not a

lesser included offense of theft by deception.
Defendant's final contention is that the trial court
erred in sentencing defendant to a term of one to fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison for each of the five counts of
securities fraud.

While defendant failed to object to the
4
imposition of this sentence, the sentence is incorrect under the
4
The only exchange concerning the prison term for securities
fraud occurred between the court and the prosecution at the
sentencing hearing on September 11, 1989. At that time, the
following transpired:
MR. JONES [the prosecutor]: . . . But as
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statute.

Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1990).

In

State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court
said:
This Court does not disturb a sentence unless
it exceeds that prescribed by law or unless
the trial court has abused its discretion.
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978).
728 P.2d at 988.

Since the law at the time that defendant was

sentenced prescribed that the prison term for securities fraud
was zero to three years, the sentence of one to fifteen years for
each count was erroneous.

This matter should be remanded to the

trial court to correct the sentences for the five securities
fraud counts.

4
Cont. to each of the Securities Counts by
themselves, I would ask the Court to run
those consecutive. I think they carry a zero
to three years in prison.
THE COURT: The securities carries a zero
to three.
MR. JONES: I think it is a zero to three.
THE COURT: They are second degree
felonies.
MR. JONES: Oh, are they? I could be
mistaken. For some reason I thought they
were zero to three.
(R. 265 at 54).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and remand for
correction of sentence.
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